The effects of public subsidies in supporting innovative activity are subject to long-standing debates. Since empirical findings remain largely inconclusive, this study adds to this debate with counterfactual evidence from a laboratory experiment. In a creative real effort task simulating the innovation process, two distinct means of allocating subsidies are compared to a benchmark treatment without subsidies to identify their effects in fostering innovativeness. Furthermore, subjects' cooperative behavior in relation to subsidies is investigated. Overall, subsidies lead to a substantial crowding-out of private investment. While the individual revenues increase due to the subsidy, the innovative activity fails to increase and less sophisticated innovations are realized. Consequently, subsidies have no or negative effects on overall welfare, depending on the subsidy specifics. However, subsidies do not influence cooperative behavior. These findings imply that the additional costs of subsidies for innovations might not be warranted by gains from additional innovations and increased welfare.
Introduction
Industrialized states use a broad composition of different policy instruments to stimulate innovations and thus promote the growth of their economies. This long-standing political objective has fostered broad discussions among policy-makers as well as in the scientific community about the determinants of innovation-based growth and the most effective policy mix in terms of incentivizing firms and individuals to innovate (Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011; Guerzoni and Raiteri 2015) . Among the most frequently used regulatory instruments are direct monetary subsidies in the form of government grants provided to firms that develop and implement innovative products and services. Advocates of this form of governmental support claim that subsidies can help to increase the overall level of innovative activity, which would otherwise fail to reach a desirable level from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, it is argued that monetary subsidies can be distributed efficiently; for example, by implementing specific tax regulations or funding-specific projects. By contrast, opponents of innovation subsidies point to a selection bias problem, criticizing that the distribution of subsidies tends to be selective and often fails to allocate funds optimally, thereby providing support for firms that are considered successful beforehand and would succeed regardless. Moreover, it is argued that the supported firms might use the grants more carelessly than their own resources, possibly resulting in dissipating or idle behavior. In addition, it is pointed out that the administration and allocation of subsidies entails considerable costs for the state and potentially leads to a crowding-out of private investment without increasing innovations and growth overall (Jaffe 2002) .
The controversial debate on innovation subsidies among policy-makers is reflected in the scientific debate, which has yielded inconclusive findings on the economic effects of subsidies in fostering innovation activities (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014 ). Aiming to craft more effective economic policies using theoretical and empirical analyses, a large number of empirical studies have examined the effect of subsidies. The results of these studies range from an additive effect on private R&D (Aerts and Schmidt 2008) , no effect (González and Pazó 2008) to a crowding-out of private investment (Wallsten 2000) . Furthermore, the effects of subsidies and cooperation on innovative firm behavior are emphasized, with a number of studies arguing that cooperation can positively influence innovative activities (Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier 2007; Fornahl, Broekel, and Boschma 2011; Nishimura and Okamuro 2011) . Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini (2014) sum up the ambiguous findings on the effectiveness of subsidies and the lack of unequivocal evidence with a basic methodological problem: "Beyond public declarations and legitimate hopes, however, there is little agreement on the effectiveness of public spending to foster private R&D. The reason is that to evaluate the effects of government-sponsored programs it is necessary to address the intrinsically difficult counterfactual question of what would have happened without the subsidies" (Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini 2014, 26) .
Building upon the statement by Blasio and colleagues, this paper aims to contribute novel empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of innovation subsidies by creating an experimental setting that enables investigating counterfactual questions. Similar to Sørensen, Mattson, and Sundbo (2010) 's suggestion, a series of laboratory experiments is conducted to analyze the effects of subsidies on the investment in and emergence of innovations. This setting is implemented to simulate the innovation process and thus compare ceteris paribus whether innovators receiving different forms of subsidies act systematically differently from those without external funding. While replicating the creative and dynamic innovation process within a task feasible for student subjects places certain restraints on the external validity of the results, the methodological approach has strong advantages; namely, the first counterfactual analysis of the effects of different forms of innovation subsidies can be presented, which includes the key features of innovation -i. e. risky investments, ownership and creativity -and thus completely reproduces the cumulative innovation process. To this end, a novel experimental setting is used that builds upon the board game Scrabble, in which subjects use letters to create words, are compensated for their innovation and are allowed to set license fees for their newly created words (Crosetto 2010; Brüggemann et al. 2016; Brüggemann and Meub 2017) .
In the first experiment, a benchmark treatment without subsidies is compared to a treatment in which subjects are provided with additional material resources in the form of extra letters; thus, the subsidy is limited to the use in innovative activities. In the second experiment, the benchmark is compared to a treatment providing subjects with monetary subsidies that can be used to buy additional letters. On a continuum ranging from a restrictive grant-in-aid to a freely usable financial assistance, this experiment implements two distinct variants that tend towards either end of the continuum. In both settings, license fees can be imposed on innovations, which provide a measure of cooperative behavior among participants. The experiments thus only differ with respect to the form of the subsidies. In both benchmark treatments, subjects are required to buy their letters: in the first experiment, subjects receive a free letter each period; while in the second experiment, they receive an additional payoff worth one letter in each period. Using these two distinct experiments, the effects of two different forms of subsidies on individual investment and cooperation behavior can be tested by making a comparison to the respective benchmark treatments. Thus, the effect of each subsidy can be assessed regarding its effectiveness for increasing innovativeness in comparison to a situation without the respective subsidy. We therefore do not aim at establishing the effectiveness of the instruments in a direct comparison but rather the effects of their introduction in a situation without the respective innovation support.
The results indicate that subsidies have no positive effects on individual innovativeness and overall welfare. Providing additional material resources restricted to the use in innovations yield no differences in welfare; indeed, offering freely-usable additional monetary resources even leads to a loss in overall welfare. Although innovators' individual incomes increase due to the subsidies, no increase in the innovative activity results; rather, subsidies substantially crowd out private investment. Regarding the specifics of innovations, subsidies foster the realization of less sophisticated innovations. In turn, cooperative behavior -as measured by the level of license fees chosen -is not affected by subsidies. From a policy perspective, the results indicate that subsidies may not yield positive effects in terms of innovativeness and overall welfare and they could even induce negative overall welfare effects when accounting for their additional costs to the state.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a review of the literature on subsidies and innovation, before section three explains in detail the experimental design and section four describes the behavioral hypotheses. The experimental results are provided in section five and section six provides policy implications and finally concludes.
Literature Review
There is a large body of empirical literature discussing the effectiveness of public subsidies by examining different government programs.
1 In a literature review, David, Hall, and Toole (2000) report that no crowding-out of private innovation investments through public subsidies occurs in two-thirds of the studies, whereby the crowding-out effect seems stronger in the USA compared with Europe. Therefore, in the majority of the studies reviewed, public subsidies are shown to have a positive impact on the innovative activity. Overall, Klette, Møen, and Griliches (2000) also find positive results when comparing five empirical studies in detail, yet they also point to methodological problems inherent in the studies. By contrast, in a more recent review, Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) sum up the literature by stating that the effectiveness of public subsidies has to be called into question due to the improved data quality in recent years. From a financial market perspective, Hall and Lerner (2010) survey the discussion of a "funding gap" in the investment for innovations and emphasize that further research should be conducted, ideally in an experimental or quasi-experimental setting.
2 Overall, the empirical evidence for developed countries is inconclusive, with many studies pointing to a positive impact on private innovative activity (Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004; Almus and Czarnitzki 2003; Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Hussinger 2008; Aschhoff 2009; Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Duch, Montolio, and Mediavilla 2009; Czarnitzki and Bento 2012; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014) . Similarly, a number of studies also identify mixed effects on the innovative activity (Cerulli and Potì 2008; Busom 2000; Heijs and Herrera 2004; González, Jaumandreu, and Consuelo 2005; Görg and Strobl 2007; Clausen 2009; Fantino and Cannone 2013; Bronzini and Iachini 2014; Becker 2015) . Conversely, other studies do not support these results and find no positive effects of public support on innovative activity (Lach 2002; Hujer and Radić 2005; González and Pazó 2008; Norrman and Bager-Sjögren 2010; Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini 2014) . Furthermore, a few authors show a full or partial crowding-out of private investment as an unintended negative effect of subsidies (Goolsbee 1998; Wallsten 2000) .
Moreover, many studies on the determinants of innovativeness find a positive impact of cooperation on the innovation output (Branstetter and Sakakibara 2002; Becker and Dietz 2004; Aschhoff and Schmidt 2008; Faria, Lima, and Santos 2010; Schwartz et al. 2012) . Discussing the effects of cooperation on subsidized innovative activity, Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) assume that the innovative output of collaborating by nonsubsidized firms would increase when participating in grant-in-aid programs. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) show positive effects of subsidies on joint innovative activity after subsidy programs have ended, with their results indicating that indirect support programs have a strong impact on the innovative activity. For firms cooperating in research activities, Fornahl, Broekel, and Boschma (2011) show that state subsidies increase the innovative activity, as measured by patent applications. However, this finding does not hold for single firms. Falck, Heblich, and Kipar (2010) find positive effects on the innovative activity of firms that pursue a clusteroriented policy, yet a decrease in private innovation expenditure. Furthermore, Sakakibara (2001) shows that subsidies have a slightly negative effect on cooperating firms' investment in innovation.
From a methodological perspective, Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini (2014) and Cerulli (2010) provide an overview of the existing empirical methods to analyze the effects of subsidies on innovativeness and discuss the problems concerned with analyzing the data in this particular field. They state that the impact of innovation subsidies cannot be effectively separated from unrelated effects and they declare that counterfactual evidence is required for more definite empirical evidence. Therefore, Sørensen, Mattson, and Sundbo (2010) suggest that experimental methods should be introduced to innovation research. To date, a small number of experimental studies have dealt with topics of innovation and analyzing different innovation policy instruments. Eckartz, Kirchkamp, and Schunk (2012) test the effects of different incentive schemes and find no substantial differences between payment schemes. Cantner et al. (2009) simulate a patent race by means of a multidimensional search task with uncertainty, finding that the difference in the subjects' earnings has a positive impact on their investment in the next periods. Darai, Sacco, and Schmutzler (2010) investigate the effects of increased competition on investments in process innovations. Implementing both a one-and two-stage setting, they find that competition through additional firms reduces investments, whereas -contrary to theoretical predictions -switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition increases investments. Aghion et al. (2014) implement a scenario of competition in a sequential innovative setting. They use a risky investment task and test for the effects of different levels of competition and time horizons. Overall, they find that competition leads to an increase in investment for neck-and-neck firms and reduced investments by firms lagging behind. Busso and Galiani (2014) present a field experiment in the Dominican Republic to determine the influence of competition on prices and quality. They find that the intervention that led to increased competition fostered a decrease in prices yet no changes in product and service quality. Ederer and Manso (2013) analyze different payment schemes for innovators by implementing a search task and observe that the possibility of early failure and rewarding long-term success motivates innovators more than pay-for-performance or a fixed wage. Focusing on the policy instrument of intellectual property rights, Buchanan and Wilson (2014) also conduct a search task to simulate innovative activity, providing evidence that innovative activity is fostered by intellectual property rights yet simultaneously induces higher prices for innovations. Meloso, Copic, and Bossaerts (2009) use the knapsack problem as a search task, in which participants have to combine items of a specific value and weight in the optimal combination to simulate the innovation process. They show that innovativeness is higher in a free market-based system compared with a patent-based system.
Extending these studies to more accurately simulate the crucial features of innovation processes in the laboratory, recent experiments have introduced elements of investment, ownership and creativity in their tasks. Crosetto (2010) first implemented a real effort word creation task to test for innovation behavior, providing subjects the possibility to choose the preferred regulatory incentive scheme, namely open source or fixed license fees. Based upon the board game Scrabble, the innovation process is simulated by having subjects create and extend words. Following this approach, Brüggemann et al. (2016) extend the design by implementing endoge-nous license fees and thus showing an increase in welfare without intellectual property rights. Considering different institutional mechanisms for fostering innovation, Brüggemann and Meub (2017) use the same experimental approach, showing that innovation contests reduce the willingness to cooperate between innovators and do not lead to additional gains in innovative activity and welfare. Further building upon the experimental design introduced by Crosetto (2010) , a real effort word creation task is implemented to test the effectiveness of subsidies as a policy instrument. Hence, two experiments are run to investigate the effect of two different forms innovation subsidies, namely providing resources exclusively determined for use in innovations and providing additional financial resources unrestricted to a specific application.
Experimental Design

Design
General Properties of the Game
To determine the effect of subsidies on the individual innovation behavior in a sequential setting, a real effort word creation task inspired by the board game Scrabble is implemented. During the experiment, subjects have to act both strategically and creatively, facing the investment decision of buying letters and acting creatively by building words, thus generating their payoff. Additionally, subjects are able to set a license fee for their newly-created words, which can be extended by other players in the course of the game. The experiment closely builds upon the experimental design introduced by Crosetto (2010) and has been modified by Brüggemann et al. (2016) and Brüggemann and Meub (2017) .
This basic setting is extended using a within-subject design, whereby each subject plays 12 periods of the real effort word creation task twice, once in the control group and once in the treatment group. The order of control and treatment groups is reversed for half of the subjects to control for distortions due to the sequence of treatments. The game is played in groups of four players, who are randomly matched for the first part over 12 periods. Once all subjects have finished the first part, subjects are again randomly matched for the second part of the game, similarly comprising 12 periods. In both parts of the game, each subject is endowed with 50 tokens and four randomly pre-selected letters. 
Course of a Turn
In each period and treatment, subjects run through five phases, for which Figure 1 provides an overview. In the production phase, subjects are asked to choose between producing a three-letter word (root), extending an already existing word (extension) or passing the turn. If subjects create or extend a word, they are asked whether or not they wish to set a license fee in the ensuing license phase. The production and license phases are played twice in each turn. In the last phase of each turn -the investment phase -subjects can buy up to two new letters.
Creating a Word
A root must comprise exactly three letters and it yields a payoff equal to the sum of the values of the letters used. Each word can be extended several times with exactly one letter in each production phase at every position of the original word, although every word can only be produced once in the game. A newly created or extended word is only accepted if it exists in the standard MS Windows dictionary for German. A letter has the same value as in the German version of the board game Scrabble, which is determined inversely proportional to its frequency in the German language; for example, the letter e has the value 1 and the letter x the value 8. The payoff for each word is calculated by the sum of all letters of the word. This also applies if a player adds a letter without having produced the original word. Thus, adding a letter to an existing word generally yields a higher payoff than producing a root. Consider for example 4 : given the letters a, e, r and t, a subject can create the roots art, ear or rat. If the respective letters are available, art can be extended into arts and dart or part − and part again into apart or party. The root art has a value of 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 tokens, whereas the extension apart has a value of 1 + 3 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 7 tokens.
This basic setting enables us to model innovations in which each step of the innovative process has more or less the same value to the final product. Consequently, no statements regarding technological milestones can be derived, in which a single part of the innovative process can be interpreted as a multiplicative technological innovation. Obviously, this is a substantial limit inherent in the design choice, which reduces the scope of the applicability to real-world innovative processes. Nevertheless, while this limitation is inherent to the basic experimental Scrabble framework, it can be suggested that it continues to apply to a large number of scenarios involving sequential innovative processes characterized by incremental innovations.
Setting License Fees and Buying Letters
Subjects are required to choose whether they wish to set a license fee or not. If subjects decide to set a license fee for their root, they are required to choose values between 10 % and 100 % of the word value in 10 % steps. The license fee subsequently remains fixed up to the end of the 12 periods. After extending a word, subjects only set the license fee for the newly added letter, as the license fee for the other letters is already defined by the previous producers. The new word -along with its license fee, the value and the producer -is displayed in the public word list on the game's main screen. By setting license fees, subjects receive additional income whenever another person extends a word with a license fee. However, license fees cannot be used as a mechanism to exclude other subjects from using a word altogether; rather, higher license fees merely make it less profitable for other players to use the word for an extension. Thus, license fees can be interpreted as a measure for cooperative behavior, whereby higher license fees indicate a low willingness to cooperate, i. e. making the access to one's words expensive. Lower fees show a higher willingness to cooperate by making extensions more profitable for other players. Furthermore, there are no transaction costs for the license fees, meaning that they can be interpreted as an instrument of redistribution within groups.
To illustrate this mechanism, consider again the example given above: the root art is worth 3 tokens and subject A sets a license fee of 60 %. Subsequently, every subject who extends art automatically pays 1.8 tokens to subject A. Afterwards, subject B adds the letter p -worth 3 tokens -and extends art into part. Due to this action, 1.8 tokens are transferred to subject A and subject B earns 1.2 tokens for art plus 3 tokens for the letter p, which yields 4.2 tokens for subject B. Furthermore, subject B also has to set a license fee for the p in the word part, e. g. 50 %. Subsequently, subject C creates the word apart and pays 1.8 tokens to subject A, 1.5 tokens to subject B and earns 3.7 tokens.
At the end of each turn, in the investment phase, subjects are asked to buy no, one or two letters for a price of 4 tokens each.
Being Not at Turn
Subjects can monitor the main board of the game when it is not their turn. Accordingly, they can see their letters, current earnings, follow the actions of the other subjects and see the list of all words produced. Furthermore, they can prepare their next turn by checking words and extensions with a free interactive spellchecker. This is necessary as new words are only accepted if they are implemented in the MS Windows dictionary.
Welfare Considerations
Altogether, the welfare created in the game depends on the relative number of extensions, given that the expected value of a letter is on average negative: buying a letter costs 4 tokens, yet the average value of a letter is 1.87. Therefore, buying a letter is a risky investment for a potential innovator, as it might lead to negative returns. Consequently, if a group only produced roots, it would experience a decline in welfare as their initial endowment would continually decrease during the game. Only by creating extensions can letters be utilized several times and thus increase overall welfare. Thus, from a welfare perspective, a successful group creates a number of roots at the beginning of the game and subsequently tends to refrain from creating new ones, but focusses on using their letters to extend existing words. Once a number of roots has been created, it becomes -in most cases -unfavorable to the overall and individual incomes to create additional roots, giving players a fairly simple rule of thumb for income maximization. Obviously, this strategy only holds given that a number of players decide to bear the individual costs of putting down roots in the initial periods of the game, thus enabling the other players to create extensions.
Treatment Conditions and Experimental Procedure
Two experiments were implemented to test for two potential designs of subsidies. They only differ compared with the control treatment in terms of the allocation of resources, as shown in Table 1 . In a within-subject design, both treatments are tested against control, where subjects do not receive a subsidy and are allowed to buy up to two letters at the end of their respective turn. In the first experiment (ExLetter) in subsidy, subjects receive an additional letter for free at the end of their respective turn and are allowed to buy one more letter. In the second experiment (ExMoney), in subsidy, subjects receive four additional tokens at the end of their turns, which is equivalent to the cost of one letter. As in control, they are allowed to buy up to two more letters at the end of their respective turn. In both ExLetter and ExMoney, subjects are informed in each turn that they receive the additional resource or the additional money, respectively. The order of the treatments is reversed in half of the sessions to compensate for learning and other effects related to the order of treatments. The 191 letters used in the game were distributed in a fixed yet random order to make the actions of the groups better comparable. Therefore, the order in which the letters were allocated to the subjects was randomly predetermined for each game before the experiment. Half of the subjects in each experiment first received the letterset from Brüggemann et al. (2014) in the first part of the game and a newly-created letterset in the second part, which was similarly randomly predetermined. For the other half of the subjects, the order in which the lettersets were used was reversed. This reversal of lettersets was again used to compensate for effects connected to the order of the letters.
The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Behavioral Economics at the University of Göttingen with a sample of 148 subjects from different academic disciplines. The software used for running the experiments was programmed using Python (Crosetto 2010) . Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) , whereby each subject was allowed to participate in one session only and none had previously participated in a similar experiment. The experiments took place in April 2014 and each session lasted around 90 minutes. On average, participants were 24.9-years old, 48.0 % were female and 39.2 % were students of economics. Each participant earned €16.99 on average, with a minimum payoff of €8.3 and a maximum of €30.2.
Hypotheses
With this experimental design, novel insight is provided for the counterfactual question concerning what effects result with and without subsidies ceteris paribus. It provides insights regarding how subsidies influence the individual behavior of innovators and thus adds to discussions on innovation subsidies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) .
First, the potential effects of subsidies on the cooperative behavior of subjects can be addressed. The initial hypothesis is motivated by previous empirical studies on the effects of subsidies on cooperation. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) find a positive impact of subsidies on innovative activities pursued in inter-firm co-operations, thus increasing the innovative output of participating firms. Consequently, the output of firms working in innovation networks is often higher compared to that of firms innovating independently (Falck, Heblich, and Kipar 2010; Fornahl, Broekel, and Boschma 2011; Nishimura and Okamuro 2011) . To provide behavioral evidence on decision-making in these situations, the individual choices of license fees can be used in our setting. Overall, more cooperative behavior in terms of lower license fees cannot be qualified as being rational behavior in general since the complex and dynamic nature of the game precludes such benchmarks. However, for a profit-maximizing player trying to open up as many potential innovative paths as possible, lower license fees can be used as a signal to other players to similarly keep license fees low and thus encourage common word creations. Despite the obvious cognitive restrictions in developing a general strategy for optimal decision-making in our game, a subject with limited sophistication choosing a clever gameplay strategy is likely to use this signaling approach to further increase her options. Additional resource allocations in the form of subsidies would not change this behavioral pattern, as players should attempt to keep license fees low to encourage additional innovative paths in either case. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is formulated:
Cooperative behavior is similar for subsidy and control.
Second, the investment behavior can be investigated when analyzing the letters acquired and the individual revenue for the innovators. This particular domain can be motivated by the majority of empirical studies, arguing that public support does not lead to a crowding-out of private investment in most cases (David, Hall, and Toole 2000) . However, some more recent studies question this assumption (Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini 2014; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) . Our experimental setting can contribute individual behavioral evidence to this open question.
Recall that a letter in this setting costs 4 tokens, while the average return of a letter is 1.87, which makes buying an additional letter a risky investment. Hence, subjects need to balance their investments with the revenues from innovative activities to achieve an overall surplus during the game. In this situation, additional resources can lead to either increased innovativeness -as intended by regulators -or a crowding-out of private investments and, therefore, a constant number of innovations. Even when acknowledging that subjects have strong cognitive limitations regarding a formally optimal decision-making during the game, it can be assumed that they are motivated to maximize their payoffs during the game. A clever, albeit cognitively limited subject following this approach would therefore tend to add the subsidies to her private investment, which then increases her chance of producing more valuable innovations. Thus, given payoff-maximizing players, there should be no crowding-out of private investment, while individual revenues as well as the overall innovativeness should increase. Therefore, hypothesis two is formulated as follows:
There is an increase of private investment in subsidy in both experiments when compared to control. b. Crowding-out of private investment does not occur in subsidy when compared to control. c. The individual revenue is higher in subsidy in both experiments when compared to control.
The third hypothesis is motivated by recently increasing doubts regarding the positive effects of subsidizing private innovative activities (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014 ), a substantial number of studies emphasize that innovation subsidies have positive effects on a country's overall innovative capacities and thus economic welfare (Czarnitzki and Hussinger; David, Hall, and Toole 2000; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014) . This paper again contributes individual behavioral patterns to this discussion by testing the overall welfare effects of innovation subsidies in an economic experiment.
Following the same logic as in Hypothesis 2, it can be assumed that even subjects unable to derive an optimal overall strategy for the game are motivated to increase their individual payoffs. Since understanding of the link between new word creations and higher individual payoffs can be presumed for all players with a very basic understanding of the game, it can be assumed that players in general aim will at maximizing their payoffs using all means available during the game. In the case of our treatments, this means directly using their newly-allocated letters or investing the subsidy in the acquisition of additional letters to create as many new words as possible. Consequently, our basic expectation is that subsidies will induce additional innovations, which then leads to an increase in the overall welfare generated, as measured by the aggregated value of all words. Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived:
a. The aggregated innovative activity is higher in subsidy in both experiments when compared to control.
b. The welfare is higher in subsidy in both experiments when compared to control.
Results
To answer the research questions as formulated in the hypotheses presented above, the results are structured as follows. First, the cooperation behavior is investigated, before the results on the individual level of the game are described, namely subjects' investment and revenue. Subsequently, the innovative activity is analyzed before the welfare perspective is taken into account and different measures of welfare are discussed.
Cooperation Behavior
After having created a word, subjects were asked whether they would like to choose a license fee or not. If subjects wanted to set a license fee, they could chose between 10 and 100 %. As discussed above, the license fees chosen can be interpreted as a measure for cooperative behavior (H1), whereby the higher the license fees, the less subjects are willing to let other subjects benefit from extending their produced words.
To analyze cooperative behavior, the number of words without license fees can be considered as an initial measure. In ExLetter, in control, 3.31 % of all words did not have a license fee; in subsidy 2.10 %; in ExMoney subjects did not select to set a license fee in control for 3.29 % and in subsidy for 2.92 % of all produced words. This low measures show a strong demand for being rewarded for the created innovations. The major factor is the average license fees over periods for each experiment, as presented in Figure 3 . The level of license fees and thus the cooperative behavior remains fairly constant over time, given that there are no differences across treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test for ExLetter z = −0.631, p = 0.5277; for ExMoney z = 0.161, p = 0.8721).
5 There are no learning or last-round effects that occur due to the within-subject design, as assessed by testing whether there are differences due to the order of treatments. The difference in the level of license fees is calculated between the order (1) control and subsidy and the alternative treatment order (2) subsidy and control. There are no significant differences when comparing the differences with respect to the order for the level of license fees (Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) test for ExLetter z = −1.634, p = 0.1023, for ExMoney z = −1.470, p = 0.1416). Overall, subsidies do not have a detrimental influence on the cooperation behavior in this setting. Interpreting this result on the level of individual strategies given cognitive limitations, it can be suggested that the motivation to be rewarded for individual word creations is stronger that the strategy of signaling the willingness to cooperate to keep as many innovative paths open as possible. If this -collectively most promising -strategy was chosen, we would see a decline in average license fees. Consequently, either the cognitive limitations or the cooperation and coordination problem related to collectively refraining from imposing license fees preclude individuals from choosing this strategy. Nevertheless, despite their inability or unwillingness to follow this strategy, the level of license fees remains stable across periods and treatments and do not increase, which would further impede innovative cooperation. Regarding our overarching question on the effect of subsidies, we can therefore state that cooperation is not negatively affected by their introduction despite subjects' inability to follow a (collectively) more productive strategy during the game.
Result 1: There is evidence in favor of H1 as cooperative behavior remains stable over time and across treatments.
Investment and Individual Revenue
To gain an overview of individual behavior in the experiments, the revenue and the investment behavior are discussed, whereby revenue is represented by the cumulative income with and without the subsidy and investment by the letters acquired during the game. 6 Recall that in control and subsidy of ExMoney, a group as a whole can buy up to 88 letters, while in ExLetter in subsidy, 44 letters are received for free and 44 letters can be bought by the subjects. The letters stock denotes a subject's average number of unused letters over the course of each treatment. The subsidy is interpreted as the resources transferred to each subject by the state. In ExLetter, the subsidy amounts to the value of four tokens for each letter received for free. In ExMoney, the subsidy equals the amount of the four free tokens, which add up to 44 additional tokens over 11 periods (excluding the final period, where no subsidy is provided). 7 All these main indicators are reported in Table 2 . The table shows that introducing a subsidy increases the number of letters acquired in both experiments. 8 However, not the entire amount provided is invested in additional letters. Subjects buy more letters in subsidy in ExLetter (WSR-test z = −3.006, p = 0.0026), albeit only when including the 44 letters received for free in subsidy.
In ExMoney, there are no significant differences in the investment behavior between treatments (WSR-test z = −1.269, p = 0.2043), thus yielding the interpretation that a substantial crowding-out of private investment occurs. In ExMoney, this is obvious as there are no differences in the investment behavior by introducing a subsidy. For ExLetter, consider that each subject receives letters worth 44 tokens but only invests 70.83 tokens. Compared to the 60.78 tokens in control, less than a quarter of the subsidy is reinvested in additional letters. Respectively, the value of unused resources -i. e. the letters stock -increases, albeit insignificantly in subsidy in both experiments (WSR-test for ExLetter z = −0.109, p = 0.9133; for ExMoney z = −0.885, p = 0.3760), meaning that only slightly more resources are left unused in subsidy in both experiments. Unsurprisingly, subjects overall generate more income in subsidy in both experiments (WSR-test for ExLetter z = −3.593, p = 0.0003; for ExMoney z = −3.823, p = 0.0001). However, considering the subsidy of 44 tokenswhich almost doubles the starting endowment of 50 tokens -and subtracting the subsidy from the revenues, subjects earn less in subsidy in ExMoney (WSR-test z = 1.912, p = 0.0559), while the difference marginally fails to be significant in ExLetter (WSR-test z = 1.350, p = 0.1769).
These results show that the effectiveness of subsidies in our sequential innovation setting is limited. The tendency to invest increases in ExLetter once a subsidy is provided, although the additional investments do not account for the full amount of the subsidy. For ExMoney, there is no difference in the investment behavior. Thus, subsidies do not add proportionally to the investments but rather lead to a crowding-out of private investment. Considering the income excluding the subsidy yields a measure for the revenue of innovative activity at the aggregate level including the costs for implementing subsidies borne for instance by the state. Looking at this particular measure shows that the average income generated by subjects is higher when no subsidies are provided. Thus, the subsidies have primarily lead to higher incomes individually while failing to induce additional investments, innovations and the resulting revenue at the aggregate level. Thus, while individual innovativeness might be higher in both treatments, the resulting income does not compensate the costs of the subsidies. This finding raises the question of whether the additional resources spent by the state through the subsidies are used in an effective way to incentivize individuals conducting more valuable innovations. On the behavioral level of individual strategies, we find that our basic behavioral expectation of how a cognitively limited, yet intelligent player interested in payoff maximization would behave, is not met. Rather, the additional cognitive effort necessary to further increase the innovative output using the subsidies is avoided. Thus, while the individual revenues are increased, the players choose to crowd out their investment using the additional resources. We can therefore conclude that subjects refrain from a strategy of payoff-maximization and instead tend to balance the cognitive effort connected to creating additional innovations and their payoff. Thus, a similar number of innovations are realized with a reduced individual effort and investment. 
Welfare and Innovation
Innovative Activity
In this section, the innovative activity is examined and different measures are developed to analyze the welfare effects (H3). Recall that as letters have to be bought at the price of four letters with an average letter value of 1.87, only the repeated use of letters generates welfare. Therefore, the ratio of extensions to roots is an important indicator for the innovative activity of groups. This ratio is shown in Table 3 , which also displays the average word length and the average word value. In general, the sum of the number of roots and extensions can be interpreted as a measure for the innovative activity, as they show how many innovations have been created overall. The table shows that the number of roots is higher in subsidy in both experiments (WSR-test for ExLetter z = −2.665, p = 0.0077; for ExMoney z = −2.110, p = 0.0349), i. e. the tendency to create basic innovations is higher when a subsidy is provided. Since it is an overall more profitable and welfare enhancing strategy to focus on creating a large number of innovative extensions on a limited number of basic innovations, the number of extensions should be considered in our analysis. Comparing the number of extensions, there are no differences between control and subsidy in ExLetter (WSR-test z = 0.240, p = 0.8103) and only weak differences in ExMoney (WSR-test z = 1.735, p = 0.0827). However, the number of extensions per root is higher in control (WSR-test for ExLetter z = 1.938, p = 0.0526; for ExMoney z = 2.093, p = 0.0364) in both experiments, which results from the higher total number of roots created in subsidy in both experiments. All other indicators show no differences between treatments and experiments. 9 This yields the interpretation that although subjects have a higher endowment in subsidy, the innovative activity does not increase. By contrast, as subjects tend to create more roots in subsidy, they seem to use the additional resources for additional basic innovations rather than more sophisticated sequential innovations. This shift towards more basic innovations is less desirable from a welfare perspective, since no additional extensions are created that use the new roots.
Result 3:
There are no differences in the innovative activity between treatments, meaning that H3a can be rejected. Introducing a subsidy leads to a shift from more sophisticated to basic innovations.
Measures of Welfare
In order to test for differences in welfare (H3b), three measures can be derived to gain a better understanding of the welfare within groups: first, the total gross value can be estimated, which comprises the value of all created innovations, i. e. the sum of all word values; second, the total net value additionally considers the investment, which includes the costs for the letters received for free (44 letters costing 4 tokens each) in ExLetter; and third, the relative net value (RNV) is used, as in Brüggemann et al. (2014) . It includes the path dependency of the game from a myopic perspective, whereby creating a new word opens and closes different future innovation paths during the game. The RNV captures this dynamic element by giving a relative measure between the most and the less valuable innovation decision that each subject could have made in each specific situation of the game. Therefore, C it is defined as the actual choice set for each subject i in period t defined by the letters owned by player i and the roots and extensions produced by all players at time t. The net payoff in each period π(c it ) is subsequently calculated for each choice c it ϵC it by deducting the investment in letters used and the license fees from the value of the new root or extension. The actual payoff π it is then evaluated by using the maximum M it = max{π(c it ),c it ϵC it } and minimum m it = min{π(c it ),c it ϵC it } payoffs achievable from C it . Note that the minimum payoff achievable from C it can even become negative due to the costs of investment in letters and unprofitable innovation decisions. Thus, the lower bound for the RNV is not generally defined as zero, but rather as the least profitable decision.
Consequently, the relative net value RNV it is computed as:
Note that RNV it ϵ [0, 1] , M ≥ 0 and m ≤ c ≤ M. Subjects should aim to maximize the RNV as it increases their payoffs. It is also a measure for subjects' performance conditional upon the opportunities that they have based upon the words already created in the game and the letters owned by each subject in any given situation. 10 The findings for the three measures are summarized in Table 4 . Regarding the total gross value, there are no differences across treatments (WSR-test for ExLetter z = −0.283, p = 0.7771; for ExMoney z = 0.543, p = 0.5869).
11 Figure 3 shows the total net value in detail, which corrects for the costs of the letters, including both the individually-bought letters and those received for free. In Figure 3 , it can be seen that groups react differently to the subsidy within each experiment: most groups (11 out of 18; 14 out of 19) perform better in control in both experiments (gray lines), in some groups the total net value does not differ and only few groups perform better in subsidy (7 out of 18; 5 out of 19). In sum, the total net value is significantly lower in subsidy in ExMoney (WSR-test z = 2.093, p = 0.0364), while in ExLetter the difference fails to be significant (WSR-test z = 1.372, p = 0.1701). Nevertheless, in ExLetter in subsidy around 33 % and in ExMoney around 28 % of the groups yield a negative total net value, which means that they were unable to create innovations amounting to the sum of their investments. This also occurs in around 22 % of the groups in control in ExMoney but in none of the groups in control in ExLetter.
These findings remain robust when path dependency is included by using the RNV, which integrates a myopic perspective. As a relative measure it can decrease during the game, in contrast to total gross value and the total net value. This might be true if subjects are unable to choose the best opportunity to innovate from the existing words and letters in the respective period. Figure 4 shows the development of the average RNV over periods for both experiments. Regarding the RNV, there are no substantial differences across treatments during the course of the game in ExLetter (WSR-test z = 0.544, p = 0.5862). In ExMoney, subjects perform better in control (WSR-test z = 1.771, p = 0.0766). In all treatments, the RNV increases at the beginning of the game. Subsequently, due to the increasing number of potential extensions, subjects become less successful in choosing the most profitable options, which leads to a slight decrease in the average RNV.
In sum, subsidies do not have a positive effect when considering three welfare measures. In fact, in ExMoney, when considering the total net value and the RNV, subjects perform worse when introducing a subsidy. In ExLetter in subsidy, one-third of the groups fail to generate positive welfare gains altogether. These findings can be understood from an individual perspective, given that subjects maximize their incomes while simultaneously reducing their effort within the game. Consequently, subjects refrain from maximizing their incomes -i. e. trying to be as innovative as possible by using the additional resources -but are rather content with receiving subsidies and realizing a reduced effort. While this behavioral pattern is individually reasonable, assuming that payoff-maximization might not the most important individual goal, this behavior does not maximize overall welfare. This contradicts our basic behavioral expectation that payoff-maximization should drive individual effort levels in our experimental setting. Instead, the most reasonable strategy given cognitive limits and a preference for limited efforts appears to be a balancing between innovative efforts and individual payoff.
This has problematic implications given the overall welfare consequences of introducing subsidies for innovative activities. Recall that welfare is defined as the sum of the value of all innovations created during the course of the game. Thus, measures leading to reduced collective innovative efforts and productivity by definition reduce overall welfare. From a welfare perspective, this effect occurs in the experiment, since subsidies lead to a lower total net value created in subsidy and a lack of additional gains in innovativeness, as indicated by the lower RNV. Furthermore, it could be argued that the costs for implementing the subsidies -e. g. by the state -have not been captured by the definition of welfare used in this paper. Thus, taking into account the actual costs incurred by the implementation of large-scale subsidies would diminish the welfare effects of allocating subsidies even further.
Result 4: H3b can be rejected as subsidies fail to increase both the individual innovativeness and the overall welfare.
Discussion of Individual Behavioral Patterns
While the complex and dynamic nature of our experimental setting effectively precludes a full benchmark model of rational behavior which could realistically be followed by subjects, we proposed a set of behavioral expectations. We suggested that individual players who had cognitive limitations but also the ability to derive intelligent rules of thumb would follow these basic strategies for succeeding in our experimental setting in terms of monetary payoff. These expectations were, firstly, to foster cooperation among the players to increase the overall innovative opportunities in the game by consistently choosing low license fees. Secondly, we expected a strong interest in increasing individual payoffs, thus letting subjects add the subsidies to their investments and refrain from a crowding-out behavior. Third, we expected that this basic interest in additional payoff would lead to individually increased innovative effort and, thus, overall welfare gains.
Instead, we find that these simple and straightforward expectations on which strategies would be chosen by intelligent players are not met. Instead of continually lowering license fees to enhance cooperation and innovative productivity, license fees remain constant on a fairly high level, whereby subsidies have no influence on this result. Further, instead of a payoff-maximization behavior, subjects choose to use the additional resources to decrease their effort levels in terms of innovative productivity while keeping their payoff constant or even slightly increasing it. Thus, the overall goal of the subsidy on an individual level is not met as it fails to stimulate higher efforts and thus innovativeness. When taking into account the costs of introducing these subsidies, these behavioral patterns in our setting lead to overall welfare losses, thus making the subsidies a rather undesirable instrument for fostering innovative activities on an individual level.
Conclusion
In this study, laboratory evidence is presented concerning the effects of subsidies in stimulating private innovative activity. An experimental approach introduced by Crosetto (2010) is used and modified, which implements the features of risky investment, creativity and ownership in a laboratory experiment that simulates a cumulative innovation process. Therefore, this experimental design allows adding counterfactual evidence to the existing literature on the effects of public subsidies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) . Two specific situations in the continuum from restrictive grant-in-aid to freely-usable monetary subsidies are applied, namely through additional material resources and a direct monetary subsidy.
The main findings of this study are that subsidies neither increase private innovative activities nor overall welfare. Furthermore, the investment behavior changes with a subsidy and a substantial crowding-out of private investment occurs. While subjects individually increase their incomes due to the higher endowments with subsidies, their innovation output remains unchanged in both experiments. Moreover, the kind of innovations produced changes due to the subsidy, whereby more basic innovations are created, which are less desirable from a welfare perspective than more sophisticated innovations. In turn, the cooperation behavior -as measured by the level of license fees chosen -does not change due to subsidies.
When taking into account different welfare measures, none of them show a positive effect of subsidies on the overall welfare. Following the individual results, subjects' behavior is influenced by the kind of subsidy: when including the costs of a subsidy incurred by the state, the overall welfare decreases in the experiment with a direct monetary subsidy and remains stable in the experiment with additional material resources. Therefore, it can be concluded that subsidies distributed in the form of additional material resources fail to increase welfare, while direct monetary subsidies even have a negative impact. Overall, these results support previous studies arguing that subsidies have little or even negative effects on the innovative activity by failing to increase innovativeness or producing a crowding-out of private investment. Accordingly, due to the additional costs to the state and the doubtful benefits, public subsidies as a policy instrument to foster private innovation might need to be called into question.
While this study has been able to yield novel empirical evidence, it also has several limitations, which should be taken into account in future studies. Regarding the experimental design, technological breakthroughs are not included; thus, only incremental, sequential innovations are modeled, which limits the applicability of the results to specific innovative settings. Regarding the treatments, only two particular kinds and amounts of subsidies are tested, whereby further studies might test different specifics of innovation subsidies in a laboratory environment. Moreover, the additional costs that the state would have to bear for implementing and distributing the subsidies cannot be considered in this setting; accordingly, further studies might include the approximate costs of introducing and distributing subsidies and thus provide an estimation concerning when the benefits of innovation subsidies exceed the costs incurred by the state.
The Payo昀f
Your payoff depends on the sum of the value of your letters, which is calculated in experimental tokens. One token is converted to €0.10 at the end of the experiment. You start this part of the game with an endowment of 50 tokens. Note that it is possible to finish the experiment with less than your starting endowment.
Please note the table below, which contains all letters, their value (in tokens) and the frequency with which they occur in the game. On the next page, you will find a screenshot of the main board of the game and some explanations to gain a first overview of the game. A detailed explanation of the game ensues.
Course of a Turn
When it is your turn, a dialog pops up asking you for choices. You have 60 seconds for your decisions. You can see the remaining time at the top-left corner of the screen. If your time expires, you are subtracted 1 token from your endowment for every additional 10 seconds.
Every turn comprises five phases:
1.Word phase I
Your activity: Producing or extending words You can use German words, their conjugations and declinations and some names of places and persons. You can test if a word is correct using the spellchecker when it is not your turn. Each letter can only be used once: after producing or extending a word, the letter will be deleted from your list.
Correct words can be built as follows:
Option 1:
a. You can produce a word using exactly three of your letters by typing the letters on your keyboard.The payoff that you earn for creating a word is given by the sum of the value of the letters (Example: 'pol': p = 4, o = 2, l = 2. This results in 4 + 2 + 2 = 8 tokens).
Option 2:
Extending a word a. You can extend an existing word by inserting one letter in any position in the word. For example, 'ast' can be extended into 'last', 'rast' and 'aste', and 'last' again into 'laust' and this into 'klaust'. It is not possible to rearrange existing words (e. g. to build from 'ast' the word 'star').
Your payoff results from the sum of the value of the letters of the newly extended word. By extending e. g. 'last' into 'laust', you get l = 2, a = 1, u = 1, s = 1, t = 1, so 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 6 tokens. Every word can only be produced once but can subsequently be used for as many extensions as possible.
Option 3:
Passing a. In case you are unable to produce or extend any word, you can pass the turn to the next player.
Royalty phase I
Your activity: Setting a royalty fee After producing a word, you have to decide whether or not to set a royalty fee that other players are required to pay when creating extensions. If you set a royalty fee, you will have to choose between 10 and 100 % of the value of the word.
If another player extends your word, the fee is automatically transferred to you. In the following, you can find three examples for others extending your word:
-If you choose no license fee, the word is entirely free to use for the other players. They will receive the entire value of the word.
-At 100 %, you will receive the initial value of the word and the next player only receives the value of his added letter.
-The choice of 20 % means that the respective player has to pay 20 % of the value of the word to you. The other player will receive 80 % plus the value of their added letter.
The word and the royalty fee remain fixed during the entire game. Both appear on the list of public words on the main board and can be used by all other players. However, other players are required to pay the respective royalty fee when extending the word. Furthermore, you will have to decide whether to set a royalty fee if you extend a word with a single letter. In this case, you only decide on the fee for your added letter.
Word phase II
After the first license phase, a second word phase ensues, in which you can produce another word following the procedure described above.
-You receive again 50 tokens. Your payoffs will be aggregated at the end of the experiment.
-The groups are matched randomly.
- [control, first; extra letter, second Apart from these changes, all parameters of the game remain constant.
B Instructions for the control task
Note: The instructions for the word task were shown to participants on the screen. ______________________________________ In the next screen, you will see a string comprising 9 letters. You will be asked to create as many German words as possible using these letters within 3 minutes. You can type the words you create in the field beneath the string of 9 letters and submit them by pressing Enter.
You can use each letter only once per word and a word cannot be shorter than 3 letters. Longer words generate more points. 3-letter word: 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 points 4-letter word: 4+ 3 + 2 + 1 = 10 points etc. After 3 minutes have expired, the test will end and you will be shown your results. As soon as you enter the next screen, the timer will start ticking.
To proceed to the next screen, please press the letter 'R' on your keyboard.
C Performance in the control task
To test for individual task-specific knowledge, a control task is run prior to the experiment. Therefore, the word task by Eckartz, Kirchkamp, and Schunk (2012) is implemented, in which subjects are asked to build as many words as possible out of the letterset accehhikllst within three minutes. The instructions for the control task are provided in Appendix B. For every word that they create, subjects earn points, whereby the number of points increases disproportionally with the word length: a word with three letters generates 6 points, a four-letter word 10 points, a five-letter word 15 points, etc. Overall, given the letterset, 330 different words can be generated, which are worth 5,585 points. In each session, the five subjects scoring the most points were awarded an additional 1€ to their overall payoff. The distribution of the groups' performance across treatments -as measured by the points achieved -is provided in Figure 5 .
